UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

9-6-2016

State v. Nesbitt Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 43911

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
Recommended Citation
"State v. Nesbitt Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 43911" (2016). Not Reported. 3089.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/3089

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
NO. 43911
)
v.
)
KOOTENAI COUNTY
)
NO. CR 2015-3266
)
DENISE FRANCES NESBITT, )
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
___________________________)
________________________

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
________________________

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
________________________
HONORABLE CYNTHIA K.C. MEYER
District Judge
________________________
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
Interim State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. #6555
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #9525
P.O. Box 2816
Boise, ID 83701
(208) 334-2712

ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534

ATTORNEY FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................1
Nature of the Case .....................................................................................1
Statement of Facts and
Course of Proceedings ...............................................................................1
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL .....................................................................2
ARGUMENT ..........................................................................................................3
I. The District Court Erred In Awarding Restitution For Items Which
Were Not Within The Scope Of The Offense For Which
Ms. Nesbitt Was Convicted And For Which She Did
Not Agree To Pay Restitution .....................................................................3
II. The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Determining The Amount
Of Restitution Because The State Did Not Meet Its Burden Of
Proving Either The Market Value Or The Replacement Cost
Of The Items Of Jewelry Ms. Nesbitt Allegedly Took From
Ms. Buck
..............................................................................................6
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................9
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ...............................................................................10

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) ................................................................... 3
State v. Davis, 156 Idaho 671 (Ct. App. 2014) ............................................................ 4, 5
State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598 (1989) ........................................................................... 6
State v. Lombard, 149 Idaho 819 (Ct. App. 2010) ....................................................... 6, 7
State v. Nienburg, 153 Idaho 491 (Ct. App. 2012) .......................................................... 4
State v. Schultz, 148 Idaho 884 (Ct. App. 2008) ............................................................. 5
Statutes
I.C. §18-2402(11)(a) ........................................................................................................ 7

ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In her opening brief, Denise Nesbitt argued the district court erred in awarding
restitution for items which were not within the scope of the offense for which she was
convicted and for which she did not agree to pay restitution as part of her plea
agreement. She also argued the district court abused its discretion in determining the
amount of the restitution award because the State did not introduce sufficient evidence
regarding either the market value or the replacement cost of the items she allegedly
stole from the victim. The State contends the district court in no way erred, but its
arguments are unpersuasive. This Court should vacate the district court’s restitution
order and remand this case to the district court for entry of a restitution award that is
properly limited in scope, and of an amount that is supported by a preponderance of the
evidence in the record.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Ms. Nesbitt relies upon the statement of facts and course of proceedings
included in her opening brief.
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ISSUES
1.

Did the district court err in awarding restitution for items which were not within the
scope of the offense for which Ms. Nesbitt was convicted and for which she did
not agree to pay restitution?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion in determining the amount of
restitution?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred In Awarding Restitution For Items Which Were Not Within The
Scope Of The Offense For Which Ms. Nesbitt Was Convicted And For Which She Did
Not Agree To Pay Restitution
The district court erred in awarding restitution for items of jewelry which
Ms. Nesbitt did not admit to taking from Ms. Buck because these items were beyond the
scope of the offense for which she was convicted and she did not agree to pay
restitution for these items as part of her plea agreement.
Ms. Nesbitt was charged by Information with one count of grand theft, committed
as follows:
That the defendant . . . on or about January 1, 2014, to July 31, 2014 . . .
did wrongfully take personal property, to-wit: jewelry, of a value in excess
of one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) from the owner, Gloria Buck, with the
intent to deprive another of property and/or appropriate to herself certain
property of another and/or appropriate to a third person certain property of
another . . . .
(R., pp.37-38.) Ms. Nesbitt entered into an agreement with the State pursuant to which
she pled guilty to this offense pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970),
and agreed to pay restitution. (R., p.41; 9/16/15 Tr., p.11; Ls.13-17.) At the hearing
where Ms. Nesbitt entered her guilty plea, her counsel described the offense as follows:
“Your Honor, between January to October of 2014, there’s allegations by an individual
named Gloria Buck that while my client was a caregiver in her house that my client
wrongfully removed jewelry from the house including rings, necklace, and I believe a
bracelet from the residence, allegations that she intended to deprive them permanently
from [Ms.] Buck, and that all happened in Idaho.” (9/6/15 Tr., p.16, Ls.5-12.) Counsel
for Ms. Nesbitt stated she was working with the prosecutor “trying to come up with an
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amount [of restitution]” but no agreement had been reached. (9/6/15 Tr., p.12, Ls.1-17;
p.14, Ls.4-7.)
Ms. Nesbitt always understood the restitution award would be limited in scope to
the items she admitted to taking from Ms. Buck and pawning for Ms. Buck’s daughter.
At sentencing, her counsel explained to the district court that Ms. Nesbitt “indicated to
me that she knows by pleading guilty she’ll be on the hook for some restitution, and
that’s the restitution that we believe the pawned items would be for that can show a
direct link to my client.” (10/29/15 Tr., p.21, Ls.13-17.) If there is any ambiguity in the
scope of the restitution Ms. Nesbitt agreed to pay as part of her plea agreement, such
ambiguity should be resolved in Ms. Nesbitt’s favor as the government ordinarily must
bear responsibility for any lack of clarity in a plea agreement. See State v. Nienburg,
153 Idaho 491, 496 (Ct. App. 2012). If the prosecutor here believed Ms. Nesbitt agreed
to pay restitution for items beyond those which she admitted to taking and pawning for
Ms. Buck’s daughter, then it was incumbent upon the prosecutor to assert that belief at
the time the district court accepted Ms. Nesbitt’s guilty plea. See id. at 498.
The State cites State v. Davis, 156 Idaho 671, 675 (Ct. App. 2014), for the
proposition that “[b]ecause [Ms.] Nesbitt pled guilty to stealing jewelry from Ms. Buck,
she was liable for the full value of the stolen property.” (Resp. Br., p.9.) But the
question here is not whether Ms. Nesbitt is liable for the full value of the property she
stole from Ms. Buck, but whether, in addition to the full value of that property, she is also
liable for the full value of the additional property Ms. Buck alleges she stole, which
Ms. Nesbitt never admitted to stealing, and for which she was not convicted. Davis
does not address this question.
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In Davis, the Court of Appeals considered whether, having pled guilty to grand
theft by possession of a stolen motorcycle, the defendant should be responsible for all
the damage to the motorcycle when some portion of that damage was caused by a third
party to whom the defendant sold the motorcycle.

156 Idaho at 672.

The Court

considered whether the defendant’s criminal conduct was the proximate cause of all the
damage to the motorcycle, and concluded it was, because the defendant intended to
deprive the owner permanently of the use or benefit of the motorcycle, and the
additional damage caused to the motorcycle by the third party was reasonably
foreseeable. Id. at 674-75. Here, Ms. Nesbitt can only be held responsible for the
financial loss Ms. Buck suffered as a result of the loss of the jewelry Ms. Nesbitt
admitted to stealing. She cannot be responsible for the financial loss Ms. Buck suffered
as a result of the loss of additional items of jewelry because she was not the proximate
cause of that loss and that loss was not reasonably foreseeable.
The State also relies on State v. Schultz, 148 Idaho 884 (Ct. App. 2008), but that
case is inapposite. (Resp. Br., pp.9-10.) In Schultz, the Court of Appeals concluded
that, after it established the defendant’s guilt at trial, the State was not precluded from
pursuing restitution for unauthorized transactions similar to the ones charged in the
information, which transactions occurred during the same timeframe and under the
same criminal theory. 148 Idaho at 886. The Court held that “restitution is statutorily
available for all unauthorized transactions [that occurred] as a direct result of
defendant’s criminal conduct and conviction for grand theft . . . .” Id. at 887. But in
Schultz, the defendant “ma[de] no challenge to the sufficiency of the state’s proof at the
restitution hearing.”

Id.

That is, the defendant did not contest that she made the
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unauthorized transactions for which the State sought restitution. Here, by contrast,
Ms. Nesbitt has always denied that she took any items of jewelry from Ms. Buck beyond
those that formed the basis of her guilty plea. The State never proved that she took any
additional items from Ms. Buck and the restitution order thus awarded restitution of a
greater scope than the offense for which she was convicted. This was error, and the
restitution order should be vacated by this Court, with instructions that the scope of the
award be limited to the items which Ms. Nesbitt admitted to taking and pawning.
II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Determining The Amount Of Restitution
Because The State Did Not Meet Its Burden Of Proving Either The Market Value Or The
Replacement Cost Of The Items Of Jewelry Ms. Nesbitt Allegedly Took From Ms. Buck
The district court abused its discretion in ordering restitution in the amount of
$7,747.80 because it did not act consistently with the legal standards applicable to the
choices before it in reaching this amount, and did not reach this amount by an exercise
of reason. See State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989) (stating standard for abuse
of discretion review). The district court could reasonably have awarded restitution in the
amount of $700 for the items Ms. Nesbitt admitted to taking and pawning. If this Court
concludes there was no error in the scope of the restitution award, then the award
should be reduced from $7,747.80 to $5,097.28, because this is the only valuation
supported by a preponderance of the evidence. The district court abused its discretion
in awarding restitution based on Ms. Buck’s testimony about the original purchase price
of her missing jewelry.
In its brief, the State cites State v. Lombard, 149 Idaho 819, 824 (Ct. App. 2010),
for the proposition that a district court can use an alternative method to determine a
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restitution amount. (Resp. Br., p.15.) Indeed, the Court of Appeals in Lombard affirmed
the use of a statistical model to determine the amount of restitution to be awarded in a
case of long-term employee embezzlement, which is a type of case with “inherent
challenges involving the estimation of the actual stolen amount.” 149 Idaho at 823. A
case of jewelry theft is not a type of case with inherent challenges involving the
estimation of the actual stolen amount.

The State could have presented evidence

regarding the market value of Ms. Buck’s lost jewelry at the time and place of the crime,
or the replacement cost of that jewelry. Such evidence would have provided a sufficient
basis for the district court to determine the value of the lost jewelry. See I.C. §182402(11)(a). But the State did not present that evidence (beyond the insurance award).
Instead, the State presented testimony from Ms. Buck regarding the original purchase
price of the various items of jewelry she alleged were stolen from her. The district court
abused its discretion in determining the amount of the restitution award based solely on
this evidence.
Even if the district court could determine a restitution award based solely on
evidence regarding its purchase price, there was no evidence here regarding at least
one of the items for which the district court awarded restitution. The district court’s
restitution award included $1,500 for a “[g]old feather pin.” (Resp. Br., p.14; R., p.96.)
In its brief, the State asserts that Ms. Buck “testified that her late husband purchased . .
. the one-of-a-kind gold feather pin for $1,500.” (Resp. Br., p.12.) This is incorrect.
Ms. Buck did not testify about the purchase price of the gold feather pin. Her testimony
at the restitution hearing was as follows:
Q:

Now, do you have any idea how much your husband paid for [the
ruby cabochon ring or the feather pin]?
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A:

The feather . . . was not included on the list I gave to you, and I
have subsequently searched for it, and it is not there. It was a very
unique piece. I am familiar with the piece.
The—I don’t know the price of it. Since it was gold, it had to be in
the hundreds of dollars, because it was obtained at a point in time
when gold was a great deal less expensive than it is now. The ring
was—it cost at the time it was purchased in about the $1,500
range.

Q:

Okay. Now, back to the feather piece, did you say that was
basically a one-of-a-kind piece—

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

—it was handmade? And you’re saying it was gold?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

And were you able to take any steps to try to determine its value?
Like, have you seen other pieces of jewelry like it?

A:

I searched for it through a lot of sites on the Internet. It was made
by an artist who typically makes these kinds of things. Since I
didn’t have it, I don’t recall the artist. I have looked through receipts
that we have. I was not able to determine that.

(11/13/15 Tr., p.8, L.14 – p.10, L.17.) There is no evidence upon which the district court
could have determined the value of the gold feather pin.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, as well as those set forth in her opening brief,
Ms. Nesbitt respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s restitution
order and remand this case to the district court for entry of a restitution award of a
scope and in amount that this Court determines to be appropriate based on the
evidence in the record.
DATED this 6th day of September, 2016.

__________/s/_______________
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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